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                                PRECEDENTIAL 
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____________ 
 
No. 12-3109 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MORDCHAI FISH, 
a/k/a Martin Fisch,  
a/k/a Mordechai Fisch, 
 
                                                       MORDCHAI FISH, 
 
                                                 Appellant  
                                        
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-11-cr-00210-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
                        
                                          
Argued on May 15, 2013 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, FUENTES and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 01, 2013) 
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O P I N I ON  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Mordchai Fish appeals the District Court’s July 5, 
2012, judgment of sentence.  He argues that the District Court 
erred by imposing a two-level enhancement for sophisticated 
money laundering under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3).  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of sentence. 
 
I. Background 
 
 Fish, a rabbi in Brooklyn, New York, was a target of a 
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large investigation into public corruption and money 
laundering in Brooklyn and New Jersey.  The investigation 
began when Solomon Dwek, a cooperating witness who was 
charged with bank fraud in 2006, informed law enforcement 
that several rabbis, including Fish, were laundering money 
through tax-exempt Jewish charities known as “gemachs.” 
 
 Dwek, under law enforcement supervision, approached 
Fish about laundering what Dwek claimed were the proceeds 
of illegal endeavors, namely a bank fraud scheme and an 
operation that produced and sold counterfeit handbags.  The 
“proceeds” were in fact funds provided by the government.  
Between May 2008 and July 2009, Fish participated in 
approximately twelve money laundering transactions 
involving over $900,000.  To execute these transactions, 
Dwek would deliver to Fish bank checks made out to 
gemachs and rabbis, and Dwek would receive cash in 
exchange, less a commission (usually 10% of the check 
value).  These check-for-cash exchanges took place at various 
locations, including a residence, a pizzeria, a bakery, a 
grocery store, a mikva (ceremonial bath house), and an office 
where Fish’s contacts had a safe, cash-counting machines, 
and checks and currencies from different countries.  The 
exchanges were at times scheduled only hours in advance and 
often involved numerous couriers.   
 
Fish made efforts to conceal the money laundering 
operations by giving Dwek SIM cards for his cell phone.
1
  He 
warned Dwek to sweep his car and phones for detection 
devices and to use code when speaking to associates about 
                                                 
1
 A cell phone user can change the number on a cell phone by 
inserting a new SIM card. 
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transactions.  In recordings made by Dwek, Fish stated that he 
had a number of money laundering connections, could 
launder money through several different rabbis, knew how 
much cash certain individuals had available at specified 
times, and had met with the “main guy” running one of the 
networks.  Fish and another participant in the scheme, Levi 
Deutsch, said that the cash came from the diamond and 
jewelry business, and Deutsch indicated that the operation 
extended to Israel and Switzerland.
2
 
 
On April 8, 2011, pursuant to a plea agreement, Fish 
pled guilty to a one-count Information charging him with 
conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(h).  The parties agreed that the total offense 
level applicable to Fish under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
would be at least 21.  The government reserved the right to 
argue for a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 
2S1.1(b)(3) for sophisticated money laundering, and Fish 
reserved the right to argue against this enhancement. 
 
In the presentence report, the Probation Department 
recommended that Fish should receive the two-level 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) and calculated a 
total offense level of 23.  At sentencing on July 3, 2012, the 
District Court reviewed the sentencing submissions, including 
a video of meetings between Fish, Dwek, and others, and 
applied the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 
2S1.1(b)(3).  The offense level of 23 resulted in an advisory 
                                                 
2
 Fish objected to specific paragraphs in the presentence 
report that mentioned his references to “Israel.”  He claimed 
that these references were to a person named “Israel” and not 
to the country. 
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Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months, and the District Court 
sentenced Fish to 46 months imprisonment.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. Discussion
3
 
 
 A. Standard of Review   
 
 The parties disagree regarding the appropriate standard 
of review:  Fish urges us to exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) while 
the government asserts that we should review for clear error.  
Only two courts of appeals have articulated a standard of 
review for a district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 
2S1.1(b)(3):  the Eighth Circuit reviews the application of 
U.S.S.G. 2S1.1(b)(3) de novo, United States v. Pizano, 421 
F.3d 707, 732 (8th Cir. 2005), and the Fifth Circuit reviews 
for clear error, United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472, 481 (5th 
Cir. 2004).   
 
 This is an issue of first impression in this Court.  
While we have not addressed this precise question, we find 
instructive how we have reviewed challenges to a district 
court’s application of the Guidelines in other contexts.  In 
cases, like this one, in which there is no dispute over the 
factual determinations but the issue is whether the agreed-
upon set of facts fit within the enhancement requirements, we 
have reviewed for clear error the district court’s applications 
of those facts to the Guidelines.  See, e.g., United States v. 
                                                 
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2012).  We will adopt 
that same standard here in reviewing the application of the 
undisputed facts to the requirements for the enhancement for 
sophisticated money laundering. 
B. Application of Enhancement 
Fish argues that the District Court erred by imposing 
the two-level enhancement for sophisticated money 
laundering under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3).  This section 
provides, “[i]f . . . the offense involved sophisticated money 
laundering, increase by 2 levels.”  U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3).  
Application Note 5 further explains:   
 
For purposes of subsection (b)(3), 
‘sophisticated laundering’ means complex or 
intricate offense conduct pertaining to the 
execution or concealment of the 18 U.S.C. 1956 
offense. 
 
Sophisticated laundering typically involves the 
use of 
(i) fictitious entities; 
(ii) shell corporations; 
(iii) two or more levels (i.e., layering) of 
transactions, transfers, or transmissions, 
involving criminally derived funds that were 
intended to appear legitimate; or 
(iv) offshore financial accounts. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3), App. Note 5.   
 
Fish argues that the District Court erred in concluding 
that he engaged in sophisticated money laundering for 
7 
 
purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) because his conduct was 
not “complex or intricate” and involved none of the factors of 
sophisticated money laundering listed in the Application Note 
5.  We agree that the determinative factors of sophistication in 
this case are not any the five factors listed in Application 
Note 5.  We disagree, however, that a finding of the existence 
of those listed facts is necessary to a determination that a 
particular scheme to launder money was sophisticated.   
 
The District Court imposed the two-level enhancement 
after noting that it “[did] not feel constrained to find the 
factors in the guidelines to be exhaustively shown.”  We 
agree with that conclusion.  The factors listed in Application 
Note 5 are illustrative but not required; they are typical but 
non-exhaustive.  When the modus operandi of a money 
laundering scheme is not made up of the Application Note 5 
factors, the district court must establish the relevant facts 
concerning the operation of the scheme and then determine 
from a review of those facts whether the scheme is complex 
or intricate.    
 
In making this determination, the District Court made 
the following factual findings:   
 
This was a long-running scheme, . . . [,] it 
became difficult to uncover because it used 
multiple outlets for cash exchanges, used 
multiple couriers, multiple locations for the 
transactions[,] [t]here was an effort made by the 
perpetrators to keep even from Dwek some of 
the knowledge of the underlying aspects of the 
case . . . [,] there was an effort made to evade 
detection because there [was] the use of codes 
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and there [were] electronic devices which had 
been changed and moved around, changing SIM 
cards, et cetera, and we also know that the 
incoming cash necessarily originated from 
numerous other accounts or sources.  
 
The District Court reviewed the “entire scenario involving 
other conspirators and other perpetrators and the fact that Fish 
was able to conduct these transactions over a long-running 
period with such facility, with so many different participants 
and so many unknown sources of money.”   
 
 The court found these facts by a preponderance of the 
evidence and applying them to the standards of complexity 
and intricacy required for sophisticated money laundering, 
concluded with “no difficulty . . . from a simple common-
sense point of view, this [scheme] had to be sophisticated.”   
 
 It is clear from the reasoning of the District Court that 
the elements of complexity and intricacy of the scheme that 
the District Court found to be relevant were the duration of 
the scheme, the difficulty in uncovering it because of the use 
of multiple outlets for cash exchanges, multiple couriers and 
other participants, and multiple locations; the secrecy of the 
underlying aspects of the scheme; the efforts to evade 
detection by the use of codes and untraceable electronic 
devices; and the multiple sources of cash.  Our clear error 
review convinces us that the District Court appropriately 
considered the factors that make a scheme sophisticated and 
that it did not err in establishing that the facts of the scheme 
supported the determination of sophistication.
4
  
                                                 
4
 Fish argues that we should be wary of setting the 
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Few courts of appeals have analyzed  U.S.S.G. § 
2S1.1(b)(3), and most have done so in cases involving at least 
one of the factors of sophisticated money laundering 
identified in Application Note 5.  See United States v. 
Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303, 320 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming the 
application of the enhancement because the district court 
“could have concluded that the charged transactions involved 
. . . ‘layering’ [and] . . . shell corporations”); Charon, 442 
F.3d at 891-92 (affirming the district court’s application of 
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) where the district court found that the 
defendant’s actions constituted layering); Pizano, 421 F.3d at 
731 (holding that the district court did not err in applying the 
sophisticated laundering enhancement “because the district 
court found that the [defendant] engaged in layering and she 
does not dispute that finding”); Miles, 360 F.3d at 482 
(affirming the application of the enhancement because 
“[w]hen an individual attempts to launder money through 
‘two or more levels of transactions,’ the commentary clearly 
subjects an individual to the sophisticated laundering 
enhancement”).   
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, affirmed 
the application of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) in a case, similar to 
this one, that did not involve any of the factors of 
sophisticated money laundering identified in Application 
Note 5.  See United States v. Chon, 713 F.3d 812, 823 (5th 
Cir. 2013).  In that case, the court rejected the defendant’s 
                                                                                                             
sophistication bar too low.  We do not believe that allowing 
district courts to look beyond the “typical” examples of 
sophisticated money laundering identified in Application 
Note 5 sets the bar too low. 
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argument that his actions “[did] not constitute ‘sophisticated 
means’ as defined in the sentencing commentary” to U.S.S.G. 
§ 2S1.1(b)(3) and held that “[m]aintaining two sets of books, 
skimming income on a daily basis, and disguising alien-
smuggling proceeds as ‘parking income’ in an attempt to 
make the criminally derived funds appear legitimate are 
sufficiently complex to support the enhancement . . ..”  Id.   
 
Similarly here we reject Fish’s argument that his 
conduct does not constitute sophisticated money laundering.  
There are adequate facts here to support the District Court’s 
conclusion that the elements and procedures of the scheme 
made it a sophisticated one.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of sentence. 
 
